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Corporate Tax and Location Choice for Multinational Firms 
 
Abstract: This paper examines the effects of corporate tax on these location decisions of newly 
established multinational subsidiaries across 26 European countries over an eight year period.  We 
contribute to the existing literature by examining the effects of a non-linear response of firm location 
decisions to changes in the tax rate.  We also show that there are large variations in the sensitivity to 
tax rates across sectors and firm size groups.  In particular, financial sector firms are more than twice 
as sensitive to changes in corporation tax rates relative to other sectors. Our baseline result is a finding 
that a one percent increase in the statutory or policy rate of corporation tax would lead to a reduction in 
the conditional location probability of 0.68 percent. Using the effective average tax rate (EATR), the 
marginal effect implies a reduction in the location probability of 1.15 percent following a 1 percent 
increase in the tax rate. Although overall tax has the expected negative effect on location probability, 
the marginal effect of an increase is lower at higher rates of tax.   
JEL Code: F23, H25, C25 
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1. Introduction 
Firms that operate in a global marketplace are faced with a variety of decisions on how to manage 
their international activities, including whether to services a foreign market from a domestic base or to 
establish a foreign affiliate to service this market. Once a firm has decided to set up a base abroad, it 
then is faced with the decision of where to locate. A wide range of factors are likely to impact on this 
decision by the firm. Particular attention has been paid to the role of corporate tax rates as a potential 
way to increase the attractiveness of a country to businesses seeking a location for a new investment.   
The effect of corporation tax differences on foreign capital has been analysed (Devereux and 
Griffith, 2002, 2003; Devereux and Freeman, 1995; Billington, 1999; Young, 1999) and the location 
decisions of FDI firms more generally have also been examined in the literature (Basile et al. 2009; 
Chen and Moore, 2010; Davies et al. 2009). These papers tend to find an inhibiting effect of tax on 
multinational entry and investment. A recent paper by Barrios et al. (2012) considers the effect of host 
and parent country taxation on the location decisions of European firms and finds a significant and 
negative effect of the effective rate as well as the host country corporation taxation on the probability 
of choosing a location. Additionally, they find an independent and strongly negative effect of parent 
country taxation on foreign subsidiary location decisions, suggesting both host and home country 
taxation are important determinants of firm operational choices on affiliate locations.  
This paper extends the existing literature on the effect of corporate taxation on location choices of 
multinationals in a number of ways. Firstly, in contrast to the existing literature which assumes a linear 
response of firm location decisions to differences in the tax rate, we test for a non-linear response, which 
implies that changes in tax rates at higher levels of taxes have less effect1. This might arise if other 
location factors dominate the location decision of a firm such that they are insensitive even to high 
corporate tax rates. For example firms might be seeking market access in a particular country or might 
also be attracted by a higher level of public goods provision that is financed by higher tax rates (see 
Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2007). 
                                                          
1 An exception is Bénassy-Quéré et al, (2015a) who included a squared tax variable in their gravity model of foreign direct 
investment flows. 
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Secondly, the model is estimated with an extensive database on newly established firms locating 
across 26 European countries and with ownership information identifying them as coming from a 
potential 48 source countries over the period from 2005 to 2012. This allows us to examine the impact 
of a considerably wider range of characteristics from the source and potential host countries than has 
generally been the case in the literature. The size of our dataset allows us to examine differences in the 
effect of corporate tax rates across sub-groups of firms and sectors.  
We find that accounting for potential non-linearity in the tax effect improves the performance of 
the model for all of the alternative measures of the tax rate. All specifications show a significantly 
negative effect of taxation on the probability of location choice but a positive squared term indicates 
that the strength of this negative effect moderates as the tax rate increases. Thus, for countries with low 
corporate tax rates, any tax-rate increase has greater relative effect on location probabilities. Given that 
a countries’ corporate tax rate tends to be correlated with GDP, moves towards tax convergence might 
disproportionately impact smaller countries in their ability to attract new investment. 
Our baseline result is a finding that a one percent increase in the statutory or policy rate of 
corporation tax would lead to a reduction in the conditional location probability of 0.68 percent. Using 
the effective average tax rate (EATR), the marginal effect implies a reduction in the location probability 
of 1.15 percent following a 1 percent increase in the tax rate. These results combine the direct and non-
linear elements of the estimated effects.   
We find large variations in the sensitivity to tax rates across sectors. For manufacturing firms, we 
find a significant negative coefficient combined with a smaller positive squared term, with the sizes of 
the effects being fairly close to those observed in the overall results. For services firms the size of the 
effect is noticeably smaller than that for manufacturing, suggesting that services firms are more likely 
to be driven in their location decisions by the need to be close to their identified customer base and this 
reduces their sensitivity to tax rates. In contrast financial sector firms appear to be the most sensitive to 
changes in corporation tax rates with an estimated marginal effect more than double those of the other 
sectors. This is likely to be a reflection of the more footloose nature of these firms. In terms of firm 
size, we find that the size of the tax elasticity increases across firm asset size groups showing that higher 
tax rates are regarded as a greater disincentive to choosing a location by larger firms.   
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The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the data used, including a discussion of the 
alternative measures available for corporate tax rates. Section 3 describes the methodology used.  
Section 4 presents the empirical results and Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Data 
The data on the number of newly established subsidiaries used in our analysis comes from the 
Bureau Van Dijk Amadeus database, supplemented with FAME data for Ireland and the United 
Kingdom. Our sample includes information on 3,238 new foreign affiliates across 26 countries for the 
period 2005-2012. In order to focus on firms with direct ownership control, we restrict our sample to 
firms we can identify as foreign owned in which the owner has an ownership percentage of 50% or 
more.   
A wide range of European countries is included in our analysis as can be seen from Table 1. We 
aggregate up NACE 2 digit sectors into the following broad categories: manufacturing, services, 
financial, and other (construction and utilities) as well as high-tech and low-tech2. The number of firms 
in each of these sectors is broken down in Tables 2. 
 
<Table 1 about here> 
<Table 2 about here> 
Amadeus contains Profit and Loss and Balance Sheet information on each firm in the database. 
However, this is not always very well reported and due to patchy coverage of other variables we can 
only include data on each firm’s total assets. For a set of regressions we group firms by size: Small, 
Medium and Large. This split is outlined in Table 3 below. 
<Table 3 about here> 
Table 4 provides information on the location of the parent company. This distribution is broadly 
as one would expect with OECD countries making up the majority of origin countries. We could only 
                                                          
2 The initial sector aggregation in table 4 is a Eurostat aggregation based on NACE Rev 1.1 codes. For further details see   
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_SDDS/Annexes/htec_esms_an2.pdf 
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include firms in which the home country was known and could be traced by Bureau van Dijk in their 
ownership database. 
<Table 4 about here> 
 
Our year coverage is from 2005-2012 as presented in Table 5. One might have expected a 
significant drop in the number of new affiliates being opened as a result of the financial crisis and 
subsequent recession in Europe in 2008. We can see this in the 2009 data, however this trend does not 
continue as we have a higher number of new affiliates opened in 2010 than any other year. 
 
<Table 5 about here>  
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2.1 Tax variables 
We use a number of alternate tax variables; the Policy Rate, the Mean Effective Average Tax Rate 
(Mean EATR) and the Total Tax Rate. We also use the EATR Crossborder as a robustness check.  
 Policy Rate: The statutory rate charged by the host country government on corporate profits 
earned by the subsidiary.  
 Mean EATR: This is calculated by comparing the cash-flows from a hypothetical, forward-
looking investment project in the presence and absence of taxation. It is a weighted average of 
the effective marginal tax rate and the policy rate, converging towards the policy rate for a 
highly profitable investment. We use the mean EATR as this also accounts for the implications 
of using different financing sources to fund the investment project, applying a weighting of 0.55 
on projects financed by retained earnings, 0.1 on equity and 0.35 on debt. In order to accurately 
calculate the NPV of the investment, this measure also explicitly considers each country’s real 
interest rate, inflation rate, true economic depreciation rate, and the NPV of capital allowances 
on different asset types; industrial buildings, intangibles, machinery, financial, inventory3.  
 Total Tax Rate: This includes all taxes and mandatory contributions payable by businesses after 
accounting for allowable deductions and exemptions. 
 EATR Crossborder: This is calculated in a similar manner to the mean EATR except in an 
international setting. The approach considers a parent firm located and owned by shareholders 
in a home country which undertakes an investment in a host country through a wholly-owned 
subsidiary. It considers taxes levied by the host country government on income earned by the 
subsidiary and corporate taxes levied by the home country government on the same income and 
personal taxes levied by the home country government on the shareholders. 
 
Table 6 below displays the descriptive statistics and sources for each tax variable used. As can be 
seen the Policy Rate and Mean EATR are highly correlated. The EATR Crossborder has a wider range 
                                                          
3 For a detailed example of these calculations for both measures of EATR please see “Section B – Worked Examples” of 
Spengel et al (2012) report for the EU Commission. 
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as this measure takes home country taxation into account. The main difference between the EATR 
Crossborder and the first two measures is the presence of some outliers in the distribution, e.g. the 
EATR Crossborder for an investment from France into Bulgaria was 52.9% in 2005.  
<Table 6 about here> 
2.2 Country-level Control Variables  
We use a wide range of country controls in our regressions, reflecting the variables commonly 
used in the literature on firm location decision. To capture information on host country market potential 
and growth we use inverse distance-weighted GDP and GDP growth respectively. The cost and quality 
of the labour force is commonly found to be a significant determinant of location choice. We include 
information on both relative labour cost and the share of the host country labour force with third level 
education.  
Other relative measures included are distance in km between home and host country capital cities, 
relative GDP per capita and relative population. In our baseline we include only the log of GDP to 
capture country size. However, in our main extended model, we replace this with the log of relative 
GDP between the home and host economies. We also conduct a robustness check to control for a non-
linear impact of country size by including a squared term with lnGDP.  
The lag of FDI stock as a proportion of GDP within each potential host country is used to capture 
agglomeration as well as potential crowding out by existing FDI firms. As this measure is broad it may 
also capture potential displacement effects of similar firms. By including the proportion of motorways 
as a percentage of total land area we have a broad proxy for the level of infrastructure in the host country.  
A range of other explanatory variables we include are dummy variables to indicate whether the 
host and home country share a common language, if they shared a colonial relationship at some stage 
in the past and if they share a border. We also include a dummy for EU15 membership. Detailed 
information on variable definitions and source data is contained in Annex 1. Table 7 contains summary 
statistics for all variables used in our analysis.  
<Table 7 about here> 
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3. Methodological approach 
To explore the relationship between the location choice of multinationals and corporate tax rates, 
we draw on the existing literature and use a conditional logit model as in McFadden (1974). This model 
has been applied empirically in the recent literature both on the wider determinants of location choices 
of multinationals (Head and Mayer, 2004; Siedschlag et al., 2013a,b) and more specifically on research 
focusing on the effect of corporation tax on MNE location decisions (Devereux and Griffith, 1998; 
Barrios et al., 2012). While alternative approaches such as the nested logit model and Poisson models 
can be used, the conditional logit is the most widely applied in the extant literature. Schmidheiny et al 
(2011) and Guimaraes et al. (2003; 2004) provide a useful discussion on the relative merits of each 
when modelling the firm location decision problem. 
To model the locational choice facing the enterprise, the firm’s problem can be outlined as follows. 
The profits earned from locating in a particular country, Πic, are:  
 Πic, =  𝜷′𝑿𝒊𝒄 + 𝜀𝑖𝑐          (1) 
Where X is a vector of location specific control variables. The firm therefore faces a choice across 
destinations which yield different potential returns, and chooses the location, c, across J alternatives, 
which maximises profit: 
Πic >  Πij ∀ j = 1, … J 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑗 ≠ 𝑐         (2) 
That is Πic  yields the highest profit across all groups. The firm therefore makes the following 
decision:  
𝑌 =  {
1 𝑖𝑓 Πic >  Πij ∀ ≠ 𝑐  
0  𝑗 ≠ 𝑐 
}        (3) 
In this case Y, the dependent variable, is an indicator of the location choice of Multinational 
Enterprise (MNE) i, over a set of all possible locations J. It is a function of the location specific 
characteristics 𝑿𝒊𝒄. Assuming that the error term 𝜀𝑖𝑐 is modelled as a type 1 extreme value distribution, 
IID across all firms and countries, the probability of choosing country c can be expressed as follows:  
𝑃(𝑌 = 𝑐|1, … , 𝐽, 𝑿𝒊𝒄) =  
𝑒𝑿𝒊𝒄𝜷
∑ 𝑒
𝑿𝒊𝒋𝜷𝐽
𝑗=1
        (4) 
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The coefficient vector 𝜷 can be estimated using maximum likelihood methods4. An important 
consideration is the selection of control variables in 𝑿. Following the existing literature, we include the 
following controls in our baseline model: market potential (distance weighted GDP), ln GDP to capture 
market size, GDP growth, host economy labour cost, the share of the population with tertiary education 
(% of labour force) to capture labour quality, the existing stock of FDI (to capture agglomeration and 
network effects), the density of motorways to capture the quality of infrastructure and the distance 
between host and home country capital cities. 
An extended, more global model includes controls for countries that share a common language, a 
common border or shared a past colonial link. A dummy for EU15 is also included while a control for 
the share of natural resources is also included. We also include relative GDP, population and labour 
costs. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm level.  
Importantly, we not only include the tax variables but also their squares to account for potential 
non-linearity in the relationship between location decisions and tax rates. We expect the tax rates to 
have a negative impact on location decisions but that the squared term has a small positive effect such 
that tax rates have a decreasing effect on location decisions at higher rates of corporation tax. Firms 
may still consider locations with very high tax rates if other factors dominate their decision. For example 
to get access to a market firms might be willing to pay higher taxes.  
When applying non-linear discrete choice models such as the conditional logit, a number of issues 
arise in calculating the magnitude of effects from the coefficients. Firstly, while the sign on the 
coefficient is always interpretable as the direction of the effect, the magnitude is not easily interpreted 
as the model is non-linear and the effect is dependent on the functional form.  
Secondly, developing a single magnitude from a coefficient is non-trivial as there are a number of 
available methodologies including estimated marginal effects and probability elasticities. Greene 
(2012) notes that the selection decision between marginal effects and elasticities, is mainly a matter of 
choice, as the sign and significance does not change between the effects. In essence both apply a 
                                                          
4 Estimation of the conditional logit model entails maximising the conditional log-likelihood, and was carried out using 
STATA 14.  
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different positive scaling to the estimated coefficient so no changes occur in relation to the sign of the 
effect.  
Thirdly, there is no consensus in the literature as to which effect is the “industry standard” with 
some papers reporting marginal effects (Devereux and Griffith, 1998; Barrios et al., 2012) and others 
reporting probability elasticities (Head and Mayer, 2004). Given our paper is closer to Devereux and 
Griffith (1998), we report estimated marginal effects. These are calculated as follows:   
𝜕𝑃(𝑦=𝑐)
𝜕𝑋
= 𝑃𝑐(1 − 𝑃𝑐)𝛽𝑋         (5) 
Where 𝑃𝑐5 simplifies to 1/J when evaluated at the means of all covariates. In our case, J = 26 
representing the number of countries in our choice set. The marginal effects can be interpreted as an 
increase in variable X by 1 percent changes the conditional probability of locating in particular country 
by the estimated value (in percent). In section 4, we provide both the coefficients and tables of estimated 
marginal effects for our tax rates of interest.  
In estimating the marginal effects for corporate taxation, consideration must be given to the fact 
that the variable enters the estimation equation in a non-linear fashion. To estimate an overall marginal 
effect for corporation taxation, which includes both linear and non-linear terms, we follow Davies et al. 
(2001) and apply the following calculation: 
𝜕𝑃(𝑦=𝑐)
𝜕𝑋
= 𝑃𝑐(1 − 𝑃𝑐)(𝛽𝑇1 +  2𝛽𝑇2 ?̂?)        (6) 
Where 𝛽𝑇1 is the estimated coefficient on the linear term, 𝛽𝑇2 is the estimated coefficient on the 
non-linear term and ?̂? is the mean tax rate from the sample data.  
 
4. Empirical results 
Our first results look at the effects on multinational location decisions for the entire sample of 
firms, focusing on the effects of various estimates of the corporate tax rate faced by the firm in each 
potential country. We then look deeper into the sensitivity of firms in different broad sectors to the 
location characteristics and to different elements of the tax structure. 
                                                          
5 Where Pc = P(Y=c) probability the location is chosen amongst the alternatives.  
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4.1 Baseline results 
We begin with the baseline results presented in Column 1 of Table 8, where we include the 
statutory policy rate as our measure of corporate tax. Looking at the other country characteristics first, 
we find the expected positive effect of GDP on the probability of locating in a particular country, 
picking up the attractiveness of access to larger and higher-income markets. In the initial specification, 
we also find a positive and significant effect of market potential. This is in line with expectations and 
captures the attractiveness of larger, closer proximity markets.  
GDP growth is insignificant in this initial specification but, as we shall see in the next table, this is 
not the case when we take into account the non-linearity of the effect of the tax rate. We find the 
expected negative and significant effect of labour cost on the location decision: in our sample, firms are 
attracted towards lower labour cost destinations. We find some evidence that labour quality is positively 
associated with location choice but the effect is weak.  
Given that labour cost and GDP per capita are quite strongly correlated (𝜌 = 0.96), we do not 
include GDP per capita in the specification. We include the lag of the stock of FDI in the economy to 
capture both agglomeration as well as potential crowding out by existing FDI firms. The literature on 
agglomeration effects has found evidence that there are benefits to firms to locating in the same regions 
as other similar firms in order to take advantage of potential spillovers and other externalities such as 
supplier and labour pools, but we do not find such an effect. This may perhaps indicate that there is also 
a competitive effect that offsets the agglomeration benefits, or, perhaps equally likely, that 
agglomeration externalities are better measured using firm counts at a regional level which we do not 
have access to. Lagged motorway density is included as a proxy for public infrastructure and has a 
positive and significant effect on the probability of location choice.   
The first tax measure we include in this baseline specification is the country’s headline policy rate 
for corporate profits, which is found to have a significant negative effect on the probability of choosing 
a location. The other columns in Table 8 examine how this result is affected by using different measures 
of the tax rate. Column 2 uses the effective average tax rate (EATR) and column 3 shows the results for 
the total tax rate. The other country characteristics have the same pattern as before, apart from labour 
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quality which becomes statistically significant. In contrast to the policy rate both the EATR and the 
total tax rate are not found to be statistically significant.  
<Table 8 about here> 
While the first results showed a negative relationship between the probability of location choice 
and corporate tax rates for only one specification, our next set of results (Table 9), which include a 
squared term for each of the tax rates, show that this was almost certainly due to not taking account of 
non-linearity in the reaction of firms to the tax rate. All three columns show a significantly negative 
effect of taxation on the probability of location choice, and the positive squared terms indicate that the 
marginal effect of an increase in the tax rate is lower at higher rates of tax. 
<Table 9 about here> 
Interpretation of the coefficients of a conditional logit model can be somewhat difficult so Table 
10 makes an adjustment following Davies et al. (2001) to convert the coefficients on the tax variables 
into marginal effects. Comparing these results to others in the literature such as Devereux and Griffith 
(1998) our baseline elasticity of 1.15 on the EATR is in line with their finding of 1.26.  
<Table 10 about here> 
4.2 Sensitivity Analysis 
In this section we provide a further robustness checks6. For two of our tax variables, the policyrate 
and the mean EATR, we apply Extreme Bounds Analysis that was first proposed by Leamer (1983). 
Extreme Bounds Analysis tests the robustness of the parameter estimates of the key variable, in our 
case the corporation tax rate, by estimating the model under alternative exclusion restrictions on the set 
of other explanatory variables. In doing so we follow Sala-i-Martin (1997), who considers the 
distribution of all resulting estimates rather than just the upper and lower extreme bounds, and McAleer 
et al. (1985) who argue that selecting a subset of variables to be included in all models, as is sometimes 
                                                          
6 In addition to the robustness checks reported here we also conducted extensive robustness checks by including both the 
EATR cross border and the mean EATR, limiting the sample to home country firms that are in the OECD, home country 
firms that are in the EU 28, removing the US firms,  removing investment option pairs (home-host) that are never chosen 
by firms, as well as adding additional and re-specified control variables. Across all robustness checks, the effects of the 
new variables and sample splits are qualitatively the same and in all cases the signs and significance of the tax rate and its 
squared term remain unchanged although the magnitudes are slightly reduced in some of the specifications. 
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practiced, is arbitrary. Considering the entire distribution of results on the basis of all possible 
combinations of other explanatory variables provides a strong test of the robustness of our results. 
In total we ran the model with 16,383 combinations of the other explanatory variables. The 
resulting distribution of the estimated coefficients for the tax variables follows a normal distribution 
with a mean coefficient on the policy rate of -7.285, and -13.478 for the Mean EATR (see Table 11). 
The 95% confidence interval around the mean of the estimates is relatively small and only encompasses 
negative values. Furthermore, over 97% of the estimated parameters for EATR and 93% of the 
parameters for the policy rate are negative, with the remaining parameters coming from models with 
only one or two additional variables that are disregarded in the Sala-i-Martin paper. This sensitivity 
analysis therefore provides overwhelming evidence of the robustness of our results. 
<Table 11 about here> 
One concern regarding our estimation is the potential for an endogenous relationship to exist 
between the statutory tax rate, or the EATR, and the location choice of firms. If countries compete over 
tax rates, as demonstrated by Devereux et al. (2008) for both the statutory and effective average tax 
rate, perhaps countries might lower their rates in an effort to attract more firms? If this were the case, 
this reverse causality would bias our tax rate coefficients.  
This is more of a concern when considering backward-looking tax rates. As highlighted by 
Devereux and Maffini (2007), backward-looking average rates, which may depend on the level of 
investment and the capital stock, could introduce endogeneity into the regressions as high levels of 
investment could generate high allowances, reducing the tax liability in that period. We do not consider 
this an issue in our analysis as we are using forward-looking tax rates and we examine the extensive 
margin, not the intensive margin7.  
4.3 Sectoral and skill variation in tax response 
The results discussed so far have pooled all firms in the sample. However, firms in different sectors 
may have different reaction functions to differences across many country level characteristics, including 
                                                          
7 As a robustness check we also estimate our model with the tax variables lagged by one period to further reduce the potential 
for reverse causality. While the effect of the tax rates using this specification are slightly smaller in absolute size, the sign 
and significance of tax coefficients remains unchanged. 
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those relating to taxation. The results are presented in Table 12 with the estimated marginal effects 
calculated in Table 13.  
We divide firms into four subgroups – manufacturing, services, financial firms and other sectors 
(primarily utilities and construction) – in order to examine if there are any differences in their sensitivity 
to the tax measures estimated above. We also separately look at the effects of a high and low technology 
split in the non-financial sectors as well as at low-tech and high-tech manufacturing and services 
separately.  
The results are quite striking, with large variation in the size of the coefficients across the broad 
sectors. For manufacturing firms, we find a pattern very similar to that of the total sample, with each of 
the tax measures having a significant negative coefficient combined with a smaller positive squared 
term.  
The estimated coefficients for services firms have the expected negative sign and are statistically 
significant but the size of the effect is smaller than that for manufacturing. We interpret this as 
suggesting that services firms are more likely to be driven in their location decisions by the need to be 
close to their identified customer base and this reduces their sensitivity to tax rates. A similar 
explanation would also apply to the generally insignificant response to tax rates for the group of other 
sectors as utilities and construction would be particularly market access driven and immobile.  
In contrast to other services firms, financial firms have a much greater sensitivity to taxation.  This 
is likely to be a reflection of the more footloose nature of these firms, given limited fixed assets relative 
to other sectors and less of a requirement to locate close to their market (particularly for more “back-
office” type operations). This could allow these firms greater freedom to choose lower tax locations 
than is the case for manufacturing and other services firms.   
As well as splitting the sample by strict economy sector, we use EC definitions for high-tech and 
low-tech industries and recalculate the effects for these groupings (excluding the financial sector). We 
also split the skill categories by manufacturing and services to explore whether there is further 
heterogeneity beneath the broad aggregation. Interesting we find that low-skill firms are more sensitive 
to tax rates and this result holds for firms in both the manufacturing and services sectors. It is unclear 
a-priori whether to expect low-tech or high-tech firms to be more or less sensitive to corporation tax. In 
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line with our findings, high-tech firms may be more inclined to prioritise labour quality or the R&D 
environment with low-tech firms taking “off-the-shelf” capital structures to the lowest cost (in terms of 
operating costs and tax considerations) destination. However, it is not necessarily the case that this logic 
applies across both services and manufacturing firms.   
<Table 12 about here> 
<Table 13 about here> 
4.4 Firm size 
As discussed in the data section, the information on firm characteristics in their year of entry is 
more limited than our information on entry and reduces the sample size by approximately one-fifth.  
However, this still leaves a large enough number of firms to allow us to do an interesting comparison 
of the sensitivity to tax rates of different sized firms, which would be an important consideration for 
policy makers. The firms are divided into three groups according to the assets of the newly established 
subsidiary (as discussed in the data section) and the location decision specification run separately for 
each group. The results are shown in Table 14 with the associated marginal effects presented in Table 
15. 
We find that across all of our measures of the tax rate there is an increase in the absolute value of 
the coefficients, showing that higher tax rates are regarded as a greater disincentive to choosing a 
location by larger firms. In addition, the countervailing positive squared term does not change much 
across the firm size group. 
<Table 14 about here> 
<Table 15 about here> 
5 Conclusions  
When companies internationalise their operations, they face many decisions. These include 
whether or not to export or to locate a plant abroad, where to locate an affiliate if FDI is the chosen 
method of globalisation, and then the volume of investment once the destination is chosen.   
This paper is narrowly focused on evaluating the role of corporation taxation on the location 
decision of foreign affiliates. It assumes that the firm has chosen FDI as its preferred internationalisation 
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strategy and does not model investment flows. Our focus is therefore on identifying the degree to which 
corporation tax affects the location decision of foreign multinationals while controlling for a range of 
other important factors such as infrastructure, market potential, labour market cost and quality and 
geographic factors.  
A number of results emerge. We find a strong negative, but non-linear, effect of taxation on the 
likelihood of a destination being chosen. The result holds using a range of tax measures including the 
statutory policy rate, an estimated effective average tax rate, and a total tax rate. The findings are robust 
to the inclusion of a range of additional control variables and sub-sample splits.   
Splitting the sample by sector and by skill type, we find that the financial sector is the most 
sensitive to changes in the corporation tax rate, following by the manufacturing and services sectors. 
The utilities and construction sectors appear the least sensitive to corporation tax changes. Across both 
non-financial services and manufacturing, the location decisions of foreign affiliates in high-tech 
sectors are less sensitive to corporation taxation changes than firms in low-tech sectors. These 
heterogeneous impacts across industrial groupings are important to understand the impact of policy 
changes to corporation taxation across countries.  
The analysis in this paper focused on location choices within Europe. A natural extension of this 
analysis is to extend the set of potential destination countries. Furthermore, our analysis only considered 
the location choice but not investment volumes. Corporation tax rates and in particular the nature of 
capital allowances might impact on investment volumes.  
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Annex: Variable Sources and Definitions 
Variable Definition Source 
Location Dummy variable equal to 1 if subsidiary is located in a country and 0 
otherwise  
AMADEUS 
GDP per capita Real GDP per capita WDI 
Market potential The sum of inverse distance-weighed real GDP of all regions other than the 
host region. Distance is measured as km between host and home country 
capital cities 
WDI, CEPII 
GDP growth Annual GDP growth, percent WDI 
Relative Labour 
cost 
Total compensation of employees divided by total number of persons 
employed 
AMECO 
Labour education Proportion of the labour force with a tertiary education, percent WDI 
Distance Distance is measured as km between host and home country capital cities  
Agglomeration Lag of the stock of FDI as a percentage of GDP, percent WDI 
Infrastructure Surface area of paved motorways as a proportion of total land area in km 
squared, percent 
Eurostat, IRF 
Infrastructure 2 Fixed broadband Internet subscribers (per 100 people) WDI 
Common 
language 
Common official primary language CEPII 
Share border Dummy variable equal to 1 if home and host country share a border and 0 
otherwise  
CEPII 
Former colony Dummy variable equal to 1 if home and host ever shared a colonial 
relationship and 0 otherwise  
CEPII 
Natural resources Total natural resources rents as a percentage of GDP, percent WDI 
EU15 
membership 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if host country is a member of EU15 and 0 
otherwise 
- 
Relative 
Population 
Home country population divided by host country population WDI 
Relative GDP PC Home country GDP per capita divided by host country GDP per capita  WDI 
Policy rate High-level policy rate KPMG, EY 
Mean EATR Griffith and Devereux (2003) methodology. This is a forward looking 
approach which calculates the reduction in the value of the profit stream for 
a model company as a result of the application of corporate income tax 
EU 
Commission  
EATR cross-
border 
Similar to the above except in an international setting. This also takes into 
account corporate taxes and personal taxes levied on the shareholders by the 
home country government 
EU 
Commission  
Total tax rate "Total tax rate measures the amount of taxes and mandatory contributions 
payable by businesses after accounting for allowable deductions and 
exemptions as a share of commercial profits. Taxes withheld (such as 
personal income tax) or collected and remitted to tax authorities (such as 
value added taxes, sales taxes or goods and service taxes) are excluded" 
WDI 
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Table 1: Number of Firms by Host Country 
Country No of Firms Country No of Firms 
Austria 101 Ireland 130 
Belgium 27 Italy 421 
Bulgaria 121 Lithuania 36 
Czech Republic 214 Latvia 42 
Germany 316 Netherlands 249 
Denmark 30 Norway 104 
Estonia 66 Poland 142 
Spain 320 Portugal 109 
Finland 40 Sweden 34 
France 213 Slovenia 23 
Greece 6 Slovakia 48 
Croatia 90 United Kingdom 342 
Hungary 14   
Total 3238 
 
 
Table 2: Number of Firms by Sector Type and Sector Skill 
   
Sector Type Number Percentage Sector Skill Number Percentage  
Manufacturing 400 12% Hi-tech 896 28%  
Services 2,020 62% Low-tech 1,703 53%  
Financial 639 20% Financial 639 20%  
Other 179 6%     
 
Table 3: Number of Firms by Asset Size 
Size Definition Number Percentage 
Small Total Assets less than €250k 950 29% 
Medium Total Assets greater than €250k and less than €3m 804 25% 
Large Total Assets greater than €3m 853 26% 
Unknown No Asset data 631 19% 
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Table 4: Number of Firms by Location of Parent Company  
Country Number of 
Firms 
Country Number of 
Firms 
United States of America 478 Australia 30 
Germany 319 Korea, Republic 
of 
30 
Luxembourg 273 Ireland 29 
United Kingdom 249 Poland 27 
Netherlands 210 Slovakia 27 
Switzerland 194 Portugal 26 
France 167 Romania 26 
Sweden 146 Malta 23 
Spain 123 Czech Republic 19 
Italy 117 Turkey 19 
Cyprus 105 Hungary 18 
Belgium 93 Estonia 16 
Austria 92 Slovenia 16 
Denmark 84 Lithuania 15 
Finland 70 Latvia 15 
Japan 54 Croatia 14 
Canada 50 Greece 11 
Norway 40 Others 13 
Total 3238 
 
Table 5: Number of Firms by Year of Entry 
Year of Entry No of Firms 
2005 389 
2006 444 
2007 423 
2008 439 
2009 217 
2010 634 
2011 486 
2012 206 
Total 3,238 
 
Table 6: Summary Statistics of Tax Variables 
Variable Source N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Policy Rate KPMG 82224 0.237 0.067 0.100 0.384 
Mean EATR EU Commission  82224 0.218 0.064 0.088 0.365 
EATR Crossborder EU Commission  80430 0.247 0.068 0.075 0.532 
Total Tax Rate WDI 82224 0.457 0.116 0.214 0.768 
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Table 7: Summary Statistics for Control Variables 
Variable Source N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Location AMADEUS 82224 0.039 0.194 0 1 
Market potential* WDI, CEPII 82224 23.058 0.895 20.402 24.133 
GDP growth WDI 82224 0.022 0.039 -0.180 0.122 
Labour education WDI 82224 0.266 0.075 0.115 0.415 
Relative Labour cost* AMECO 82224 -0.401 2.470 -6.995 3.421 
Agglomeration WDI 82224 0.513 0.331 0.098 2.044 
Distance* CEPII 82224 7.396 0.943 4.088 9.802 
Infrastructure  82224 0.016 0.016 0 0.064 
Common language CEPII 82224 0.068 0.252 0 1 
Share border CEPII 82224 0.096 0.295 0 1 
Former colony CEPII 82224 0.044 0.205 0 1 
Natural resources WDI 82224 0.016 0.032 0 0.219 
EU15 membership - 82224 0.530 0.499 0 1 
Relative Population* WDI 82224 0.691 2.246 -5.627 5.464 
Relative GDP PC* WDI 82224 0.579 0.863 -3.134 3.076 
* Variable in natural logarithm 
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Table 8: Estimates of Conditional Logit Model for Multinational Location Choice – 
Baseline – Linear Tax Rates 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 b/se b/se b/se 
Market Potential 3.114*** 3.221*** 3.170*** 
 (0.334) (0.337) (0.330) 
Ln GDP 0.684*** 0.614*** 0.634*** 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.026) 
GDP Growth -0.628 -0.268 -0.365 
 (0.886) (0.890) (0.890) 
Ln Labour Cost -0.271*** -0.364*** -0.341*** 
 (0.049) (0.049) (0.044) 
Labour Quality 0.510 0.664* 0.720* 
 (0.416) (0.403) (0.434) 
FDI Stock (% of GDP) 
t-1  -0.895*** -0.855*** -0.876*** 
 (0.080) (0.078) (0.084) 
Motorway Density 4.743*** 3.277** 3.533** 
 (1.455) (1.504) (1.513) 
Ln Distance -1.283*** -1.289*** -1.285*** 
 (0.042) (0.041) (0.041) 
Policy rate -2.092***   
 (0.603)   
Mean EATR  0.840  
  (0.701)  
Total Tax Rate   0.008 
   (0.188) 
N 82224 82224 82224 
Pseudo R2 0.121 0.120 0.120 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 9: Estimates of Conditional Logit Model for Multinational Location Choice – Baseline 
Quadratic Tax Rates Tax Rates 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 b/se b/se b/se 
Ln GDP 0.704*** 0.732*** 0.643*** 
 (0.029) (0.033) (0.025) 
Market Potential 3.932*** 4.674*** 3.489*** 
 (0.364) (0.390) (0.331) 
GDP Growth 0.986 1.478 3.246*** 
 (0.890) (0.916) (1.005) 
Ln Labour Cost -0.182*** -0.038 -0.533*** 
 (0.047) (0.053) (0.051) 
Labour Quality 0.598 -0.428 2.763*** 
 (0.414) (0.411) (0.502) 
FDI Stock (% of GDP) 
t-1  -1.154*** -1.032*** -1.082*** 
 (0.083) (0.081) (0.085) 
Ln Distance -1.369*** -1.414*** -1.350*** 
 (0.043) (0.044) (0.042) 
Motorway Density 6.623*** 5.887*** 7.891*** 
 (1.508) (1.526) (1.553) 
Policy rate -21.917***   
 (2.241)   
Policy rate 2 0.382***   
 (0.041)   
Mean EATR  -34.530***  
  (2.879)  
Mean EATR 2  0.665***  
  (0.052)  
Total Tax Rate   -14.519*** 
   (0.942) 
Total Tax Rate 2   0.148*** 
   (0.010) 
N 82,224 82,224 82,224 
Pseudo R2 0.125 0.129 0.132 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 10: Marginal Effects – Baseline and Extended Models 
 Policy rate Mean EATR Total Tax Rate 
Baseline (Linear) 
Marginal Effect  -0.07   
Baseline (Quadratic) 
Marginal Effect -0.80 -1.26 -0.53 
Notes: Marginal effects are calculated as Davies et al. (2001).   
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Table 11: Descriptive Statistics for Distribution of Tax-rate Coefficients 
Variable Model runs Mean Std. Dev. 95% CI for mean 
Policyrate 16,383 -7.285 5.199 [-7.365, -7.205] 
Mean 
EATR 16,383 -13.478 7.470 
[-13.592, -
13.363] 
 
Table 12: Coefficients – By Sector 
 Policy rate Mean EATR Total Tax Rate Obs 
Manufacturing 
Coeff Tax -17.123*** -25.630*** -13.061*** 10,123 
Coeff Tax Rate ^ 2 0.356*** 0.526*** 0.140***  
Services 
Coeff Tax -8.489*** -20.527*** -12.346*** 51,235 
Coeff Tax Rate ^ 2 0.211*** 0.510*** 0.130***  
Financial sector 
Coeff Tax -36.832*** -70.170*** -18.188*** 16,339 
Coeff Tax Rate ^ 2 0.327** 1.086*** 0.176***  
Other (Utilities and construction) 
Coeff Tax -13.177 -18.240 -19.896*** 4,527 
Coeff Tax Rate ^ 2 0.276 0.352 0.226***  
High-tech non-financial 
Coeff Tax -4.562 -12.740** -13.647*** 22,791 
Coeff Tax Rate ^ 2 0.078 0.275*** 0.136***  
Low-tech non-financial 
Coeff Tax -12.361*** -24.990*** -12.377*** 43,094 
Coeff Tax Rate ^ 2 0.316*** 0.614*** 0.137***  
High-tech Manufacturing 
Coeff Tax -5.377 -17.878 -11.016*** 4,468 
Coeff Tax Rate ^ 2 0.127 0.381* 0.112***  
Low-tech Manufacturing 
Coeff Tax -25.511*** -32.439*** -14.649*** 5,655 
Coeff Tax Rate ^ 2 0.528*** 0.665*** 0.164***  
High-tech Services 
Coeff Tax -5.6 -13.637** -15.052*** 18,323 
Coeff Tax Rate ^ 2 0.079 0.276** 0.149***  
Low-tech Services 
Coeff Tax -10.204*** -25.572*** -11.141*** 32,912 
Coeff Tax Rate ^ 2 0.289*** 0.663*** 0.123***  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 13: Marginal Effects – By Sector 
 Policy rate Mean EATR Total Tax Rate 
Split by Sector Type 
Manufacturing -0.63 -0.94 -0.48 
Services -0.31 -0.75 -0.45 
Financial sector -1.36 -2.58 -0.67 
Other (Utilities and construction)   -0.73 
Split by Sector Skill 
High-tech non-financial  -0.47 -0.50 
Low-tech non-financial -0.45 -0.91 -0.46 
Split by Sector Type & Skill 
High-tech Manufacturing   -0.41 
Low-tech Manufacturing -0.93 -1.19 -0.54 
High-tech Services  -0.50 -0.55 
Low-tech Services -0.37 -0.93 -0.41 
 
Table 14: Coefficient Estimates by Firm Size 
 Policy rate Mean EATR Total Tax Rate 
Size 1 -  Small 
Coeff Tax 5.501 -20.149*** -11.449*** 
 (5.985) (5.394) (1.754) 
Coeff Tax Rate ^ 2 0.043 0.596*** 0.136*** 
 (0.102) (0.100) (0.017) 
Size 2 - Medium 
Coeff Tax -13.807*** -28.864*** -14.001*** 
 (4.897) (5.296) (1.782) 
Coeff Tax Rate ^ 2 0.359*** 0.689*** 0.157*** 
 (0.084) (0.098) (0.017) 
Size 3 - Large 
Coeff Tax -26.834*** -36.680*** -12.432*** 
 (4.358) (5.329) (1.933) 
Coeff Tax Rate ^ 2 0.414*** 0.654*** 0.121*** 
 (0.081) (0.100) (0.020) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Model estimated using all controls as in main extended model.  
 
Table 15: Marginal Effects by Size 
 Policy rate Mean EATR Total Tax Rate N 
Size 1 – Small  -0.74 -0.42 24,056 
Size 2 – Medium -0.50 -1.06 -0.52 20,350 
Size 3 – Large  -0.99 -1.35 -0.46 21,714 
 
